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In what sense are mental disorders brain disorders? 
Explicating the concept of mental disorder within RdoC 
Abstract 
Recently there has been a trend of moving towards biological and neurocognitive based 
classifications of mental disorders that is motivated by a dissatisfaction with the syndrome-
based classifications of mental disorders. The Research Domain Criteria (indicated with the 
acronym RDoC) represents a bold and systematic attempt to foster this advancement. 
However, RDoC faces theoretical and conceptual issues that need to be addressed. Some of 
these difficulties emerge when we reflect on the plausible reading of the slogan “mental 
disorders are brain disorders”, that according to proponents of RDoC constitutes one of its 
main presuppositions. Some authors think that endorsing this idea commits RDoC to a form 
of biological reductionism. We offer empirical and theoretical considerations for concluding 
that the slogan above should not be read as a reductionist thesis. We argue, instead, that the 
slogan has a pragmatic function whose aim is to direct research in psychopathology. We show 
how this function might be captured in the framework of a Carnapian explication as a 
methodological tool for conceptual engineering. Thus, we argue that a charitable 
interpretation of the aims of the proponents of RDoC should be understood as an attempt at 
providing an explication of the concept of mental disorder in terms of brain disorder whose 
main goal is to provide a more precise and fruitful notion that is expected to have a beneficial 
impact on classification, research, and treatment of psychiatric conditions. 
Key words: conceptual engineering/explication, biological reductionism, DSM-5, ICD-10, 
mental disorder, natural kinds, Research domain criteria (RDoC), philosophy of psychiatry 
1. Introduction 
Recently there has been a trend towards biological and neurocognitive based classifications 
of mental disorders. (Brazil, van Dongen, Maes, Mars, & Baskin-Sommers, 2018; Insel & 
Cuthbert, 2015; Wiecki, Poland, & Frank, 2015). The Research Domain Criteria (RDoC), for 
instance, aims at determining categories of mental disorders that would reflect, to a greater 
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extent, the biological underpinnings of psychological disturbances and health problems 
(Cuthbert & Insel, 2013; Insel et al., 2010). The motivation of these approaches is replacing 
syndrome-based classifications as encapsulated in many diagnoses in classificatory systems 
such as the Diagnostic statistical manual of mental disorders (American Psychiatric Association 
& American Psychiatric Association, 2013, APA) or the International classification of diseases 
(World Health Organization, 1992, WHO). In these systems, mental disorders are categorised 
in terms of symptomatic behaviours, mental disturbances, and maladaptive personality traits, 
and not on the basis of their aetiology or underlying biological factors (Murphy, 2006; Tabb, 
2015). 
In this paper we aim at explicating and clarifying some methodological assumptions of 
RDoC and similar biologically based approaches to the classification of mental disorders. We 
focus on the issue of the correct interpretation of the slogan “mental disorders are brain 
disorders” that is often associated with such classifications (Insel & Cuthbert, 2015). We argue 
that this claim should not be read as a commitment to a form of biological reductionism, as, 
for instance, Borsboom, Cramer, and Kalis do in a recent target paper in Behavioral and Brain 
Sciences (2019). Instead, we maintain that the slogan has a pragmatic function that should 
direct research in psychopathology. We show how this function might be captured in terms of 
a broadly construed notion of explication as elaborated by Rudolf Carnap (1971) and 
contemporary scholars such as Catarina Dutilh Novaes (2018). We argue, thus, that the 
function of the explication of the concept of mental disorder in terms of that of brain disorder 
is to provide a more precise and fruitful notion that is expected to have a beneficial impact on 
the classification, research, diagnostics, and the treatment of psychiatric conditions. 
The paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we introduce RDoC and describe the main 
reasons that have motivated its creation and adoption. In Section 3, by means of an example 
concerning antisocial personality disorders, we argue that this type of approach is not 
committed to a classical form of reductionism. In section 4, we argue, instead, that the idea 
that mental disorders are brain disorders has a pragmatic function that should direct research 
in psychopathology. Finally, in the same section we show how this idea might be outlined in 
terms of a Carnapian explication as conceptual engineering. Here the explication of the 
concept of mental disorder as a disorder of brain circuits is expected to integrate psychiatry 
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with the rest of medicine with the final aim of improving research and clinical practice in 
treating psychopathology. 
2. The RDoC approach to the classification of mental disorders 
The Research Domain Criteria (RDoC) project is a recent, biologically oriented approach to 
categorization of mental disorders (see, e.g. Insel et al., 2010). Its final goal is to develop new 
classification systems of psychiatric conditions based on data spanning from genetics and 
neurobiology to self-reports and behavioural tasks. Integrating new with already available 
biological data RDoC create more valid measures of disorders which would aid clinical practice 
and improve health outcomes (Cuthbert, 2014; Cuthbert & Insel, 2013; Insel et al., 2010). 
While the long-term goal of RDoC is to develop personalised form of psychiatric treatment, 
the short term goal is to provide a platform for “research that can produce pioneering new 
findings and approaches to inform future versions of psychiatric nosologies” (Cuthbert & Insel, 
2013, p. 7). 
The main reason for introducing RDoC is to overcome serious problems in mental health 
research and clinical practice. In the last 50 years there has been a considerable advancement 
and impact of research in treating bodily illnesses that improved health outcomes and reduced 
mortality rates (Bethesda, 2011). However, in the case of mental disorders there are neither  
similar improvements in research and diagnosis, nor in treatment that led to a reduction of 
mortality rates and improvement of health outcomes (Cuthbert & Insel, 2013). The 
proponents of the RDoC project argue that some of the impediments to progress in clinical 
practice can be traced back to the currently dominant syndrome-based categorizations of 
mental disorders, as embodied in the DSMs (APA 2013) and ICDs (WHO 1992) (Buckholtz & 
Meyer-Lindenberg, 2012; Cuthbert & Insel, 2013; Lilienfeld, 2014). Let us consider some of 
these problems (for a thorough comparative analysis, see Clark, Cuthbert, Lewis-Fernández, 
Narrow, & Reed, 2017). 
Syndrome based classifications that are based on DSM-5 and ICD-10 delineate categories 
of mental illnesses in terms of clusters of symptoms. Starting with DSM III (APA, 1980), the 
main goal of such approaches has been to devise reliable diagnoses which would enable 
communication between different researchers, epidemiological studies, psychiatric 
treatment, and practical applications, such as for insurance purposes (Cooper, 2005). It was 
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thought that the best way to accomplish this was by building “a-theoretical” classifications, in 
the sense that categories would be based on observable symptoms and not on specific 
theories about the causal aetiology of mental disorders developed by different schools of 
thought in psychiatry (Tsou, 2011).  
For instance, according to DSM-5, the core of the diagnosis of a major depression is stated 
as a list of symptoms:  
Five (or more) of the following symptoms have been present during the same 2-
week period and represent a change from previous functioning; at least one of the 
symptoms is either (1) depressed mood or (2) loss of interest or pleasure. (APA 
2013, p. 160) 
Some of the symptoms are:  
1. Depressed mood most of the day, nearly every day, as indicated by either 
subjective report (e.g., feels sad, empty, hopeless) or observation made by others 
(e.g., appears tearful). 
2. Markedly diminished interest or pleasure in all, or almost all, activities most of 
the day, nearly every day (as indicated by either subjective account or 
observation.) 
4. Insomnia or hypersomnia nearly every day. 
7. Feelings of worthlessness or excessive or inappropriate guilt (which may be 
delusional) nearly every day (not merely self-reproach or guilt about being sick). 
9. Recurrent thoughts of death (not just fear of dying), recurrent suicidal ideation 
without a specific plan, or a suicide attempt or a specific plan for committing 
suicide. (APA 2013, pp. 160–161) 
Despite the research and practical virtues of an “a-theoretical” system of classification, in 
recent years the syndrome-based approach has been criticised for its many misgivings, 
including the fact that it disregards the causal underpinnings of diseases in their classification 
(Murphy, 2006; Tabb, 2015). The problems with syndrome-based approaches to mental 
disorders as captured by DSM-5 and ICD 10 are numerous and already well known (see, e.g. 
Buckholtz & Meyer-Lindenberg, 2012; Lilienfeld, Smith, & Watts, 2013). To summarize the gist 
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of these difficulties, we can cast them by using the notion of natural kind. This concept is 
generally taken to refer to a good scientific category (see Brzović, 2018). 
Many philosophers of psychiatry agree that mental disorder categories purport to capture 
natural kinds (see, e.g. Beebee & Sabbarton-Leary, 2010; Brzović, Hodak, Malatesti, Šendula-
Jengić, & Šustar, 2016; Samuels, 2009; Kendler, Zachar, & Craver, 2011; Tsou, 2016; cf. Tabb, 
2019a; Haslam, 2014). On these views, natural kinds should not be seen as possessing 
biological essences, in the sense of possessing necessary and sufficient conditions that 
determine when a particular instance falls under the kind term. Rather, natural kinds are 
construed as denoting clusters of properties or causal structures that enable reliable 
predictions and explanatory generalizations about its instances (Boyd, 1991; Khalidi, 2013; 
Slater, 2015; for a review, see Brzović, 2018). In the context of research and clinical practice 
in biomedicine, having such kinds should enable us to develop classifications which would 
capture the causal underpinnings of different illnesses and their characteristic trajectories, 
with the aim of successfully treating them (Brzović et al., 2016; Brzović, Jurjako, & Malatesti, 
2018; Brzović, Jurjako, & Šustar, 2017; Kendler et al., 2011). In order to serve these 
explanatory, inductive, and clinical purposes, the kinds or classifications in psychiatry should 
enable reliable diagnosis, predict temporal trajectories of illnesses, and enable preventive 
interventions and the design of effective therapies. 
The basic complaint against the categories in currently dominant syndrome-based 
classification systems is that in many cases they do not capture natural kinds and thus that 
psychiatric practice might benefit from revising them (Brzović et al., 2017; Murphy, 2006). This 
complaint is expressed by claiming that the current syndrome-based classifications, for the 
most part, have low validity. “Validity” can mean different things in biomedical research. In 
this context it refers to the idea that a good category of a mental disorder will denote a specific 
set of symptoms that differentiates it from other disorders, correlates with different 
behavioural, cognitive and biological measures, has a specific development trajectory and a 
specific response to treatments (Aboraya, France, Young, Curci, & LePage, 2005). In other 
words, a valid psychiatric category should provide grounds for inductive generalizations and 
explanatory information characteristic of natural kinds that can be used in clinical practice for 
prediction, interventions, and treatment.  
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Current categorizations are not valid in this sense because they cover heterogeneous 
groups of people which undermines reliable prediction and treatment outcomes (Lilienfeld, 
2014; Lilienfeld et al., 2013). Moreover, different categories in DSM and ICD show extensive 
comorbidity. For instance, studies indicate that around 20% of individuals who received a 
diagnosis on DSM-IV also satisfy criteria for three or more other disorders in the same manual 
(see Lilienfeld et al., 2013). Such comorbidity indicates that the diagnostic category is not well 
formed. This also precludes successful treatment, given that a clinician does not know which 
therapy to administer. In general, the fact that different DSM and ICD categories share 
symptomatology creates difficulties in investigating biological correlates of mental disorders 
and using such information for devising new research and clinical studies. 
Bruce Cuthbert and Thomas Insel indicate how the problems with DSM reflect on scientific 
and clinical research: 
Decades of research have increasingly revealed that neural circuits and systems 
are a critical factor in how the brain is organized and functions, and how genetics 
and epigenetics exert their influence. However, this knowledge cannot be 
implemented in clinical studies as readily as might be hoped. Any one mechanism, 
such as fear circuits or working memory, is implicated in multiple disorders as 
currently defined; it is difficult to know which diagnostic category to select first to 
explore any promising leads, and a positive result immediately raises the question 
of whether the demonstration of efficacy must be extended to all similar disorders 
(a time-consuming and expensive proposition). (Cuthbert & Insel, 2013, p. 3) 
In addition, studies show that most categories in DSM-IV do not have a categorical 
structure (Haslam, Holland, & Kuppens, 2012), rather they denote disorders whose symptom 
severity is dimensional. Thus, there is not a clear boundary between people suffering from a 
mental disorder and those who are not. DSM 5 is, thus, often criticized for presupposing that 
mental disorders have a categorical structure (Buckholtz & Meyer-Lindenberg, 2012; 
Lilienfeld, 2014). This is another sense in which DSM categories do not designate unified 
clusters of symptoms that might be viewed as natural kinds (Haslam, 2014). 
The RDoC presents a serious and in some ways radical response to the problems 
mentioned above (Cuthbert & Insel, 2013; Insel et al., 2010). Its aim is to replace the old 
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schemes of psychiatric classifications and build, almost from scratch, new systems of 
classification that should have beneficial and far-reaching consequences for research and 
treatment of mental illnesses. The basic idea is to reconfigure psychiatric categories by 
creating research platforms that would enable researchers to gather and integrate already 
available genetic, neurobiological, cognitive, self-report, and behavioural data in addition to 
producing new data. This would help psychiatry devise valid categories of groupings that are 
more homogenous and providing grounds for developing therapies that are more effective.  
In this sense, one could say that the goal of the RDoC project is to rebuild psychiatric 
categories in order to reflect natural kinds regarding mental disorders which might at first 
glance seem incorrect since, in contrast to the syndrome-based approaches, RDoC takes a 
dimensional approach to classifying psychiatric disorders (see Buckholtz & Meyer-Lindenberg, 
2012; cf. Haslam, 2014). However, this issue is resolved by emphasizing that the cluster view 
of natural kinds (as expounded earlier in the text), does not presuppose that kinds have clear-
cut boundaries. Rather, the main claim is that natural kinds, or in other words, good scientific 
classifications, are those that support explanations and inductive inferences that play a role in 
specific domains of research or practice (see Slater, 2015). 
The RDoC’s emphasis on biological factors in devising classifications is a built-in feature of 
this approach. Thomas Insel and colleagues, who initiated the RDoC project, indicate that 
RDoC has three assumptions: 
First, the RDoC framework conceptualizes mental illnesses as brain disorders. In 
contrast to neurological disorders with identifiable lesions, mental disorders can 
be addressed as disorders of brain circuits. Second, RDoC classification assumes 
that the dysfunction in neural circuits can be identified with the tools of clinical 
neuroscience, including electrophysiology, functional neuroimaging, and new 
methods for quantifying connections in vivo. Third, the RDoC framework assumes 
that data from genetics and clinical neuroscience will yield biosignatures that will 
augment clinical symptoms and signs for clinical management (Insel et al., 2010, 
p. 749).  
Emphasis on the biological factors and the claim that mental disorders are brain disorders 
and the philosophical issues that it raises will become important in the next section. In the 
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rest of the section we will outline how RDoC is expected to be and already has been 
implemented in practice. Insel and Cuthbert explain that: 
(t)he approach proceeds in two steps. The first step is to inventory the 
fundamental, primary behavioral functions that the brain has evolved to carry out, 
and to specify the neural systems that are primarily responsible for implementing 
these functions. (…) The second step then involves a consideration of 
psychopathology in terms of dysfunction of various kinds and degrees in particular 
systems, as studied from an integrative, multi-systems point of view. (Cuthbert & 
Insel, 2013, p. 4) 
The first step led to defining, on empirical grounds, 6 major domains that are further 
divided into measurable dimensions (see table 1 below). These dimensions are 
neuropsychological constructs that provide the backdrop for conducting research in the next 
step. As such they are subject to continuous scientific validation and revision.1 
Table 1: The research domain criteria, November 2019 based on RDoC 
https://www.nimh.nih.gov/research/research-funded-by-nimh/rdoc/constructs/rdoc-
matrix.shtml 
Negative 
Valence 
Systems 
Positive 
Valence 
Systems 
Cognitive 
Systems 
Social Processes Arousal and 
Regulatory 
Systems 
Sensorimotor 
Systems 
Acute Threat 
("Fear") 
Reward 
Responsivenes
s 
Attention Affiliation and 
Attachment 
Arousal Motor Actions 
Potential Threat 
("Anxiety") 
Reward 
Learning 
Perception Social 
Communication 
Circadian 
Rhythms 
Agency and 
Ownership 
Sustained 
Threat 
Reward 
Valuation 
Declarative 
Memory 
Perception and 
Understanding of 
Self 
Sleep-
Wakefulness 
Habit - 
Sensorimotor 
Loss  Language Perception and 
Understanding of 
Others 
 Innate Motor 
Patterns 
Frustrative 
Nonreward 
 Cognitive 
Control 
   
  Working 
Memory 
   
 
 
1 See https://www.nimh.nih.gov/research-priorities/rdoc/index.shtml  
This is a preprint of the manuscript forthcoming in Phenomenology and Mind ISSN 2239-4028 (online) 
9 
 
The envisioned new research design based on RDoC domains and constructs can be seen 
as also involving two steps (Cuthbert & Insel, 2013, p. 5). The first concerns the selection of 
the target group of people. Standardly, this group would be delineated by symptoms 
comprising a mental disorder category in the DSM-5 or ICD 10. Given that RDoC is not 
constrained by such diagnostic categories, the target sample could be delineated by using 
other criteria. For instance, these could include all patients at a clinic exhibiting anxiety 
symptoms or even inmates in a forensic institution exhibiting externalizing behaviour (Brazil 
et al., 2018; Cuthbert & Insel, 2013).  
In the next step an independent and a dependent variable would be chosen from 
dimensions relating to the constructs that need to be measured from the six domains. These 
dimensions can be defined on “different levels of analysis, from genetic, molecular, and 
cellular levels, proceeding to the circuit-level (…), and on to the level of the individual, family 
environment, and social context” (Insel et al., 2010, p. 749). See, for instance table 2 below, 
for these levels in relation to the construct Acute Threat “Fear”. 
 
Thus, in devising constructs that should augment clinical practice and research there are 
no privileged levels of analysis, although there is an invitation to tend more to the neural 
circuits that can be seen as playing the mediating role between the lower genetic and 
molecular levels and higher cognitive/affective functions and behavioural symptoms. 
Table 2: Levels of analysis in RDoC, November 2019 based on RDoC 
https://www.nimh.nih.gov/research/research-funded-by-nimh/rdoc/constructs/rdoc-
matrix.shtml 
Construct/Su
bconstruct 
Genes  Molecules Cells Circuits Physiolog
y 
Behavior Self-
Report 
Paradigm
s 
Acute Threat 
("Fear") 
 
BDNF CCK 
Cortisol/C
orticoster
one CRF 
family 
Dopamine 
Endogeno
us 
cannabino
ids FGF2 
GABA 
Glutamat
… 
GABAergi
c cells  
Glia 
Neurons 
Pyramidal 
cells 
autonomi
c nervous 
system 
BasAmyg 
Central 
Nucleus d-
hippocam
pus … 
Elem BP 
Context 
Startle 
EMG Eye 
Tracking 
Facial 
EMG Fear 
Potentiate
d Startle  
… 
Analgesia 
approach 
(early 
developm
ent) 
Avoidance 
Facial 
expressio
n 
 … 
Fear 
survey 
schedule 
SUDS 
Behaviora
l 
Approach 
Test CO2 
Challenge 
Test Cold 
Pressor 
Test Fear 
Conditioni
ng  
Stranger 
Tests  
Trier  
This is a preprint of the manuscript forthcoming in Phenomenology and Mind ISSN 2239-4028 (online) 
10 
 
3. In what sense mental disorders are not brain disorders 
Given that one of the presuppositions of RDoC is that mental disorders are brain disorders, it 
might be assumed that this approach endorses a form of reductionism (see, e.g. Borsboom et 
al., 2019). Traditional forms of reductionism in philosophy of psychiatry purport to reduce or 
identify mental disorders with neural disorders (see, e.g. Szasz, 1974). If such a reduction could 
be made to work, the imperative would be to ground classifications of mental disorders on 
classifications of brain disorders. In this case, the role of biological or neurological variables 
would be constitutive of the classification.  
However, we think that RDoC should not be associated with this type of reductionism (see, 
also, our manuscript Jurjako, Malatesti, & Brazil, 2019a). Traditionally, reduction is conceived 
as a relation between theories T1 and T2 where theory T1 is reduced to T2, if it is possible, by 
means of bridging principles that characterise the concepts in T1 in terms of the concepts of 
T2, to logically derive the statements of T1 from those of T2 (Nagel, 1987). A classic example is 
the reduction of thermodynamic theory of gases to the molecular kinetic theory of gases. 
There, the crucial element is the bridging principle that identifies the thermodynamic concept 
of temperature with mean kinetic energy, which allows a reduction of the equations 
describing the behaviour of macroscopic gases to the equations of statistical mechanics 
describing the behaviour of microscopic molecules that compose gases. 
The classical view of reduction seems to presuppose that theoretical roles of the terms 
that are being reduced can be specified independently from the terms that play similar roles 
in the reductive theories. When translated to the present context, the idea would be that a 
reduction requires providing independent identification criteria for symptoms that define a 
syndrome of a mental disorder and features that individuate its neural reductive base 
(Borsboom et al., 2019).  
As we have seen, however, the RDoC project is principally motivated by the dissatisfaction 
with syndrome-based categorizations of mental disorders as captured in different versions of 
DSM and ICD (Buckholtz & Meyer-Lindenberg, 2012; Cuthbert & Insel, 2013; Lilienfeld, 2014). 
Accordingly, the aim of RDoC is to revise our current classifications of mental disorders by 
including a dataset from genetic and neurobiological to cognitive and behavioural factors, 
rather than reducing them to unique neurobiological mechanisms (Cuthbert, 2014; Cuthbert 
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& Insel, 2013; see, also, Tabb, 2019b). Moreover, in these revised data-driven classifications 
the focus is on the newly available neurobiological data that are correlated with different 
behaviourally defined disorders, but not to the exclusion of other behavioural, psychological, 
phenomenological, social and even normative factors (Insel & Cuthbert, 2015). The aim of this 
reclassification is to find cognitive, genetic, neurobiological or even behavioural differences 
that might be conducive to better diagnosis, treatment, and prediction of health outcomes. 
A recently proposed RDoC type of approach to antisocial personality disorder and 
psychopathy illustrates these points (we develop these points in more detail in Jurjako et al., 
2019a). Antisocial personality disorder (ASPD) is in the DSM-5 characterized as a pervasive 
disposition towards violating social and moral norms, that starts before the age of 15 and is 
underpinned by hostile attitudes and lack of remorse for persistent antisocial behaviour. 
Psychopathy, which should not be confused with the general diagnosis of ASPD, can be seen 
in forensic manifestations as an especially severe form of ASPD (Hare, 2003). Psychopaths are 
characterised by callous attitudes, lack of empathy and remorse, complete disregard for other 
people’s interests and safety, manipulative and conning interpersonal styles that tend to be 
accompanied by different forms of aggressive and generally antisocial behaviour (for a review, 
see Brazil & Cima, 2016).  
Given that standard measures of ASPD and psychopathy are grounded in syndrome-based 
approaches to psychiatric classifications (see, e.g. Međedović, Bulut, Savić, & Đuričić, 2018) 
they inherit all of the problems related to such classifications (see section 2 above). They 
include heterogeneity and low construct validity which lead to forming groups of people that 
often do not share meaningful cognitive, biological, or aetiological underpinnings (Cooke, 
2018; Jurjako, Malatesti, & Brazil, 2019b; Međedović, Petrović, Kujačić, Đorić, & Savić, 2015; 
Rosenberg Larsen, 2018). In that sense they fail to fulfil the standards for being a biomedical 
natural kind (Brzović et al., 2016, 2017; Maibom, 2018). It is assumed that these problems 
explain the lack of successful therapies for reducing antisocial behaviour and devising 
coherent policies for regulating the social response to these individuals when they offend 
(Jurjako & Malatesti, 2018b, 2018a; Jurjako et al., 2019b). 
The concrete proposals, in the spirit of RDoC, to overcome the problems that afflict 
syndrome-based classifications of antisocial personalities, involve revisions of these 
categories in accordance with the already available and expected new cognitive and biological 
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data underpinning antisocial behaviour (see Brazil et al., 2018; Jurjako et al., 2019a, 2019b). 
In accordance with RDoC, attempts to stratify and rebuild categories of persistent antisocial 
behaviour start with behaviourally defined criteria for individuating groups of antisocial 
individuals (Jurjako et al., 2019b). In practice this will involve going to clinical and forensic 
facilities in order to investigate individuals who show extremely aggressive, maladaptive, and 
generally antisocial behaviour. Once we have individuated such groups we can investigate the 
genetic, neurobiological, cognitive, psychological, environmental, self-reports, 
neuropsychological, and other behavioural correlates to form inductively more robust 
groupings, in the sense that such groupings would enable better predictions regarding group 
inclusivity for research purposes, and finally treatment outcomes. From this procedure it 
should be clear that antisocial behaviour and its psychological concomitants will not be 
reduced to genetic and neurobiological mechanisms because environmental, behavioural, and 
psychological criteria provide data points whose epistemic value is on a par with other more 
biological factors that help to determine the revised groupings. This procedure is just an 
example of how RDoC is supposed to be applied in practice. Therefore, there is nothing in the 
RDoC approach to psychiatric research that presupposes classical reductionism and the ability 
of identifying different levels of description independently from each other. 
It remains, thus, to be explained how we should understand the slogan that “mental 
disorders are brain disorders” if not in the classically reductionist sense. Addressing this 
problem requires, preliminarily, distinguishing different important theoretical issues to which 
the slogan might apply. We begin next section by drawing these distinctions. 
4. Engineering the concept of mental disorder 
Jerome Wakefield (2014) usefully distinguishes between conceptual validity and construct 
validity of disorder categories. In this context, construct validity refers to explanatory factors 
that delineate one disorder category from another. For instance, it is expected that two 
different disorders will have different risk factors, causal antecedents, development 
trajectories, and so on. Conceptual validity refers to criteria that determine when a category 
designates a disorder as opposed to a normal variation. In other words, conceptual validity 
pertains to offering criteria about what confers a disorder status to a condition. With respect 
to this distinction, a category might have construct validity, but not conceptual validity, and 
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vice versa. For instance, if psychopathy is not a mental disorder then it is not conceptually 
valid although it still might be valid as a construct because it delineates a scientifically relevant 
cluster of personality traits (Jurjako, 2019). Alternatively, psychopathy might be a mental 
disorder and thus conceptually valid, but lack construct validity, because, for instance, it is 
comprised of a group of people that are too heterogenous (Brzović et al., 2017). 
There are different philosophical views on what confers a “disorder” status to a mental or 
a bodily condition. According to Thomas Szasz (1974; see, also, Boorse, 2014) for a mental 
disorder to be real, it must consist of a neural deviance from “objective” standards of brain 
anatomy and physiology. From this, Szasz concludes that mental illnesses, although legitimate 
problems of living, are either mythological medical entities or neurological disorders. Other 
views adopt a more normative approach, indicating that the concept of a mental disorder 
cannot be defined without some reference to social norms or value judgments (see Kingma, 
2013, 2014). These approaches would admit the importance of neural causes and markers in 
the categorisation and explanation of mental illnesses but would not require that what confers 
an illness status is a disorder of the brain specified independently from any normative 
considerations about the role that the brain plays in cognitive, behavioural, and social matters. 
Several contemporary authors endorse this position by arguing that the disorder or illness 
status must partly (Wakefield, 1992) or completely (Bolton, 2008; Fulford, 1989) be a matter 
of societal or other type of evaluations (for a recent discussion of this issue in the context of 
DSM, see Amoretti & Lalumera, 2019b, 2019a; Cooper, 2013).  
The supporters of RDoC seem to be silent on the issue of conceptual validity. According to 
Cuthbert and Insel: 
RDoC is committed to studying the ‘full range of variation, from normal to 
abnormal.’ In some cases, only one end of a dimension may involve problem 
behavior (for instance, one is seldom likely to complain of an outstanding memory 
or keen vision), but often both extremes of a dimension may be considered as 
‘abnormal’ (…). (Cuthbert & Insel, 2013, p. 5) 
Investigating variations from normal to abnormal brain function indicates that RDoC is not 
primarily about determining what makes some set of properties symptomatic of a mental 
disorder. Thus, they allow that there might be some other criterion, beside the independently 
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specified brain function that determines whether some condition is a psychiatric disorder 
worth treating. Moreover, given that Cuthbert and Insel (2013) hold that brain functions could 
be specified by behavioural functions the brain evolved to implement, it is not reasonable to 
expect that the assumption that mental disorders are brain disorders will be specified by 
independently identifiable biological causes. In this spirit, Anneli Jefferson (2018) has argued 
that brain dysfunctions are sufficient to confer a disorder status to a brain state, however, 
what provides the normative criterion for deciding when a brain is dysfunctional might rely on 
mental or, more generally, social considerations. In this sense, we might identify mental 
disorders with brain disorders by mentalizing the brain, so to speak. This is compatible with 
Cuthbert and Insel’s idea that we might determine the function of different brain areas and 
neural circuits by investigating what cognitive, behavioural or social functions the brain 
evolved to implement. 
Thus, RDoC seems to be compatible with normative and strictly naturalistic ideas about 
what confers a mental disorder status to a condition, be it characterized as mental or bodily. 
Accordingly, we agree with Wakefield (2014) that RDoC does not offer a criterion for 
conceptual validity for categories of mental disorder. However, we do not see this as its 
weakness because RDoC is first and foremost a research project, while offering an account of 
what makes a mental condition a disorder as opposed to a normal variation belongs to 
perplexing conceptual issues of the philosophy of psychiatry. 
So, if RDoC does not offer a criterion for conceptual validity, and is even compatible with 
views that would determine when a brain is disordered by reference to social criteria, we 
might again ask why is one of the assumptions of RDoC that mental disorders should be 
thought of as brain disorders? We think that this claim has a descriptive and a prescriptive 
dimension.  
Regarding the descriptive claim, some proponents of RDoC indicate that with new 
discoveries about the biological and neuroscientific underpinnings of many psychiatric 
conditions and their implementations in practice we will, as a matter of fact, start to see 
mental disorders as brain disorders (see, also, Murphy, 2017 for relating this claim to 
eliminativism in philosophy of psychology). Here is an indicative statement of this descriptive 
reading: 
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recently psychiatry has undergone a tectonic shift as the intellectual foundation 
of the discipline begins to incorporate the concepts of modern biology, especially 
contemporary cognitive, affective, and social neuroscience. As these rapidly 
evolving sciences yield new insights into the neural basis of normal and abnormal 
behavior, syndromes once considered exclusively as “mental” are being 
reconsidered as “brain” disorders—or, to be more precise, as syndromes of 
disrupted neural, cognitive, and behavioral systems. (Insel & Cuthbert, 2015, p. 
499) 
In this sense, the descriptive claim concerns an empirical question for which time will show 
whether mental disorders will be reinterpreted as disturbances of brain networks 
underpinning cognitive and behavioural functioning.  
The more interesting reading of the slogan that mental disorders are brain disorders is the 
one that highlights its prescriptive dimension. Among the proponents of the RDoC type of 
approach to classification there is a sense that progress in psychiatry will be achieved only if 
we reconceptualise mental disorders as brain disorders. Here the emphasis is on the 
reconceptualization of mental disorders as brain disorders and not on their reduction. 
The RDoC approach to psychiatric classification and research can be conceptualised as 
recommending a co-evolutionary model, instead of a reductive one, of the relation between 
top-down descriptions and explanations of mental phenomena and bottom-up descriptions 
and explanations pertaining to neurobiological mechanisms (Churchland, 2006; see, also, 
Bermúdez, 2005 ch. 5). In this case, top-down considerations would specify behavioural and 
psychological functions the brain is supposed to carry out, and the level of genetics and neural 
circuits would be accordingly used to specify normal and abnormal ways of their functioning 
(see section 2 above). In the present context, to discuss the details of how such a co-
evolutionary model could apply to the overall RDoC approach is beyond the scope of this work. 
In fact, that would require addressing, amongst other issues, difficult problems concerning 
explanation and causation between the different levels touched upon by the different type of 
considerations described above (Bermúdez, 2005). We limit ourselves, instead, to discuss and 
clarify a conceptual dimension of the co-evolutionary way of thinking that we think can be 
plausibly related to RDoC. 
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We think that the plea for reconceptualization embedded in the slogan that “mental 
disorders are brain disorders” associated with RDoC might be interpreted as a plea for 
explicating the concept of mental disorders in terms of of disturbances or dysfunctions of the 
neural networks (see Insel & Cuthbert, 2015; White, Rickards, & Zeman, 2012). 
In recent discussions of philosophical methodology, explication is often understood as a 
process of conceptual re-engineering (Brun, 2016). The main aim is to make an imprecise or 
vague everyday concept (technically called explicandum) into a more precise concept 
(technically called explicatum) that is more suitable for theoretical, scientific or even 
pragmatic purposes (Brun, 2016; Dutilh Novaes, 2018).  
Rudolf Carnap (1971), who provided one of the first systematic expositions of explication, 
gave four requirements that an adequate explication should satisfy:  
1. Similarity: the explicatum should be similar to some degree in meaning to the 
explicandum;  
2. Exactness: the explicatum should be more exact in meaning than the 
explicandum;  
3. Fruitfulness: the explicatum should be fruitful with respect to accomplishing the 
aims of the research project (for example, for formulating theorems in logic or 
empirical laws in natural sciences);  
4. Simplicity: it is expected that a vague concept could be explicated in more than 
one way. If two or more possible explications satisfy the above criteria than 
simplicity could be used to choose among the alternative explications (see Brun, 
2016, p. 1215).  
Successful explication does not have to satisfy all of the requirements of adequacy to the 
same degree, rather “an explicatum counts as adequate just in case it meets these criteria to 
a sufficient degree” (Brun, 2016, p. 1215). Here we will concentrate on the requirement of 
fruitfulness, because it has been argued that this is the “the crucial requirement for a 
successful explication” (see, also, Carus, 2009; Dutilh Novaes, 2018, p. 202; Dutilh Novaes & 
Reck, 2017).  
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Carnap originally explained a successful explication by using the example of Fish as an 
explicandum that can be adequately explicated in terms of the explicatum Piscis: 
When we compare the explicandum Fish with the explicatum Piscis, we see that 
they do not even approximately coincide [...]. What was [the zoologists’] motive 
for [...] artificially constructing the new concept Piscis far remote from any concept 
in the prescientific language? The reason was that [they] realized the fact that the 
concept Piscis promised to be much more fruitful than any concept more similar 
to Fish. A scientific concept is the more fruitful the more it can be brought into 
connection with other concepts on the basis of observed facts; in other words, the 
more it can be used for the formulation of laws. (Carnap, 1971, p. 6) 
According to Carnap, the pre-theoretical or ordinary concept of Fish is replaced by a more 
precise concept of Piscis, which is more fruitful in scientific contexts because it allows us to 
formulate general (or empirical law-like) statements that in turn underpin successful 
explanatory practices, increase predictive power and empirical testability. For instance, 
although whales and dolphins might have fallen under our pretheoretical concept of Fish, they 
do not fall under the concept of Piscis, because the latter excludes mammals. 
In addition to the more theoretical reading of fruitfulness, some authors emphasize that 
fruitfulness of an explicatum can be generally related to our research purposes, whether they 
be strictly scientific/theoretical or more broadly practical/political. Thus, in general we can say 
that the fruitfulness of an explicatum can be related to its ability to systematize a domain of 
inquiry according to our purposes or aims (Carus, 2009; Dutilh Novaes, 2018). In this respect, 
explication is a process of conceptual re-engineering where the criteria of successful 
explication will depend on what we need these concepts to do for us relative to some project 
or inquiry we find valuable.2 
In the context of RDoC, we argue that its assumption that mental disorders should be 
reconceptualised as brain disorders can be plausibly justified as a plea for making the concept 
 
2 That is why Dutilh Novaes (2018) argues that Carnapian explication can be viewed as a methodology similar in 
spirit to ameliorative analysis as expounded by Sally Haslanger (2012), where the method of ameliorative analysis 
refers to an exercise of engineering concepts that is shaped by our political ideals and aims, such as correcting 
social injustices. These approaches to philosophical methodology are currently discussed under the heading of 
conceptual engineering. See Cappelen (2018) for a book length discussion of these issues.  
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of mental disorder more fruitful in conducting psychiatric research and devising more 
effective therapies. The aim is to improve psychiatric practice and devise more effective 
treatments by theoretically and practically unifying knowledge about the biological, cognitive 
and behavioural systems underpinning what we currently call mental disorders (Insel & 
Cuthbert, 2015).  
The kind of problems that proponents of RDoC see regarding current psychiatric 
classifications and how to address them testify the explicatory aim of these approaches. Insel 
and Cuthbert are rather clear about what propels their view that mental disorders should be 
redefined as brain disorders. First, they state that: 
before research on the convergence of biology and behavior can deliver on the 
promise of precision medicine for mental disorders, the field must address the 
imprecise concepts that constrain both research and practice. (Insel & Cuthbert, 
2015, p. 499, emphasis added) 
Further they emphasize that imprecise concepts: 
like “behavioral health disorders” or “mental disorders” or the awkwardly 
euphemistic “mental health conditions, ”when juxtaposed against brain science, 
invite continual recapitulation of the fruitless “mind-body” and “nature-nurture” 
debates that have impeded a deep understanding of psychopathology. (Insel & 
Cuthbert, 2015, p. 499) 
They see the imprecision of the concept of mental disorder as impeding psychiatric 
research, and thus replacing this imprecise concept with a concept of brain disorder as 
referring to “syndromes of disrupted neural, cognitive, and behavioral systems” (Insel & 
Cuthbert, 2015, p. 499) is expected to transform for the better diagnostic procedures and 
eventually improve health outcomes.  
Similarly, Peter White, Hugh Rikards, and Adam Zeman’s (2012) plea for redefining mental 
disorders as dysfunctions of the central nervous system could be charitably read as suggesting 
an explication of the concept of mental disorder in terms of brain dysfunctions. They argue 
that mental disorders should not be grouped separately from the disorders of the brain. 
Keeping separate categories for mental and brain disorders creates an illusion that 
psychological functions have a different ontology than brain functions. To ground a division 
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between mental function and brain function is like treating heart function as fundamentally 
different and disconnected from heart anatomy. If this is implausible in the case of the heart, 
then it should be implausible in the case of the brain and psychological function.  
The negative consequences of this division are, according to them, particularly noticeable 
in the “bizarre double accounting”. For instance, in ICD-10 “dementia in Alzheimer’s disease” 
is classified as a mental disorder (F00), while Alzheimer’s disease is classified under neurology 
(G30)” (White et al., 2012, p. 2). Furthermore, this conceptual division has negative practical 
consequences on institutional division between psychiatry and the rest of medicine. Thus, 
White and colleagues argue that “changing the classification” by reconceptualising mental 
disorders as disorders of the nervous systems “will epitomise an intellectual shift with far 
reaching beneficial consequences” which are expected to include research, medical, and social 
benefits (White et al., 2012). 
Thus, construing mental disorders as brain disorders should invite a more integrative 
perspective by thinking about the brain as the seat of psychological and behavioural functions 
(Jefferson, 2018). Given these facts, currently unsuccessful attempts at treating mental 
disorders and prospects for advancement in devising treatments and improving health 
outcomes is likely premised on our (in)ability to take into consideration the wealth of current 
and future knowledge of the biological factors that underpin our psychological and 
behavioural functions and their characteristic patterns of malfunctioning.  
The idea that we should reconceive mental disorders as brain disorders should not be read 
as endorsing crude versions of explanatory reductionism. Instead, it should be read as an 
invitation to avoid the pitfalls of drawing arbitrary wedges within the field of medicine and 
engage the promising projects that aim at improving research, treatment, and health 
outcomes by readily integrating psychiatry with the rest of medicine. 
5. Conclusion  
There are several theoretical and empirical considerations for moving beyond syndrome-
based classifications of mental disorders. RDoC represents a bold but a systematic attempt to 
foster this advancement. Besides the considerable empirical difficulties that this approach 
faces (Lilienfeld, 2014), there are important theoretical and conceptual issues that need to be 
addressed. Some of these difficulties emerge upon reflection on the plausible readings of the 
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slogan “mental disorders are brain disorders”, that is often associated with biologically 
grounded approaches to classification of mental disorders. 
We have offered conceptual and theoretical considerations for concluding that the slogan 
above should not be read as an explanatory reductionist thesis. Moreover, current 
formulations of the biologically based classifications do not appear to involve commitments 
on the issue of conceptual validity. In these approaches there is no explicit or strictly logically 
required statement about what confers a disorder status to the investigated conditions. 
Finally, while a descriptive reading of the thesis that “mental disorders are brain disorders” is 
an interesting prediction about our future conceptual and medical practices, we think that the 
most important reading is a prescriptive one. This is the idea that the categorisation of mental 
disorders should be motivated by the assumption that they are brain disorders.  
We have shown how a prescriptive reading of “mental disorders are brain disorders” 
slogan should be viewed as recommending a revisionary project for conceptually 
reconfiguring the categories of mental disorders. Such a plausible and promising project of 
reconfiguration confers to biological variables a deserved, although not exclusive, role in the 
classification of mental disorders. We have further clarified this conceptual reconfiguration in 
the terms of a notion of explication, that, firstly formulated by Carnap, has an increasingly 
influential currency in contemporary philosophy. 
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